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Post-Ipp special limitation periods for cases of injury 
to a child by a parent or close associate: New 
jurisdictional gulfs 
Dr Ben Mathews∗ 
The Ipp Review of the Law of Negligence made several recommendations 
concerning time limitation periods within which civil claims may be 
instituted. Among these was a recommendation for a special limitation 
period for cases where a child is injured by a parent or a person in a close 
relationship with the child’s parent, recognising the unfairness of a standard 
limitation period for these cases. New South Wales and Victoria have 
enacted legislative changes pursuant to this recommendation, giving much 
more time to commence litigation where a child is injured by a parent or a 
parent’s ‘close associate’. These provisions provide particular relief to 
plaintiffs in many cases of child abuse. This article examines these 
provisions and their rationales, and explores how they will operate. It will be 
argued that other jurisdictions should follow the lead of New South Wales 
and Victoria to eliminate unjustifiable jurisdictional differences in access to 
justice. 
1. Limitation periods and minority 
In all States and Territories of Australia, except Western Australia, actions for 
damages for personal injuries must generally be commenced within three years from 
when the cause of action arose.1 In Western Australia, a plaintiff has four years to 
commence litigation for damages in trespass to the person, assault and battery, and six 
years if proceeding in negligence.2 In New South Wales and Victoria, actions brought 
concerning injury sustained after recent amendments in the wake of the Ipp Report3 
have time running from the date of discoverability rather than from when the cause of 
action arose.4 The date of discoverability is the date when the plaintiff knew or ought 
to have known of the injury, the defendant having caused that injury, and the fact that 
the injury is of sufficient seriousness to justify bringing an action.5  
                                                 
∗  LLB (JCU), BA (Hons) (QUT), PhD (QUT); Lecturer in the School of Law, Queensland University 
of Technology. The author is grateful to Professor Harold Luntz for comments on an earlier draft of 
this article. 
1  Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) ss 18A(2) and 50C; Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) s 11; 
Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) s 36; Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) s 5(1); Limitation of Actions 
Act 1958 (Vic) ss 5(1AA) and 27D(1)(a); Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) s 16B; Limitation Act 1981 
(NT) s 12(1)(b). 
2  Limitation Act 1935 (WA) ss 38(1)(b) and s 38(1)(c)(vi) respectively. Since Wilson v Horne (1999) 
8 Tas R 363 held that an action exists in both negligence and trespass for the acts constituting child 
sexual abuse, this can therefore bring different limitation periods into play in Western Australia.  
3  Commonwealth of Australia, Review of the Law of Negligence Report, Canberra, 2002 (Ipp 
Report), pp 90 ff ([6.18] ff). 
4  Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50C; Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27D. In New South 
Wales, the new provisions apply to injuries sustained on or after 6 December 2002; in Victoria, the 
new provisions apply to injuries sustained on or after 21 May 2003. 
5  Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50D; Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27F.  
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1.1 Suspension of limitation period during minority 
In jurisdictions other than New South Wales and Victoria, children are exempted, 
because of their lack of legal capacity, from the expectation that they will bring an 
action within the limited time; where a child suffers personal injury the time period is 
suspended until the child attains legal majority.6 There is a significant restriction on 
this exemption in Tasmania. There, the suspension of time does not operate in cases 
of personal injury to a child through negligence, nuisance or breach of duty, if the 
child was in the custody of a parent.7 In most Australian jurisdictions, therefore, a 
survivor of child abuse has until turning 21 to institute proceedings.8 For reasons 
discussed shortly, even this time period is impossible for many survivors of child 
abuse to meet, so many plaintiffs in this class of case who are faced with a defendant 
who is unwilling to settle the claim are forced to apply to the court for an extension of 
time or to abandon the action. 
1.2 Abolition of suspension during minority: New South Wales and Victoria  
However, the suspension of the three-year period so that it runs from majority now no 
longer applies in New South Wales and Victoria. Where a child suffers injury caused 
by someone who is not a parent or a close associate of a parent, amendments 
motivated by the Ipp Report abolish this position. Instead, provided that a child is in 
the custody of a capable parent or guardian, the child is deemed not to be under a 
legal disability or incapacity,9 and the child’s parent or guardian is required to bring 
the action on the child’s behalf within a set period of time, which may often be a 
much shorter period than would exist in other Australian jurisdictions. Discoverability 
in these cases is sheeted home to the child’s parent or guardian.10 In New South 
                                                 
6  Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) ss 5(2), 11, 29(2)(c); Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) s 
45; Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) ss 2(2), 26(1); Limitation Act 1935 (WA) s 40; Limitation Act 1985 
(ACT) ss 8(3), 30; Limitation Act 1981 (NT) ss 4(1), 36. 
7  This has been the situation since enactment of the Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) s 26(6). The phrase 
‘breach of duty’ has been held by the Victorian Court of Appeal to include acts of intentional 
trespass: Mason v Mason [1997] 1 VR 325 at 330.  This means that the exclusion of the suspension 
operates whether the action is brought in trespass or negligence. 
8  In Western Australia a survivor of child abuse will have until 22 or 24 depending on the cause of 
action relied on. 
9  Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50F(2)(a); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27J(1)(a). 
Compare the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 87J(a), inserted by the Trade Practices Amendment 
(Personal Injuries and Death) Act (No 2) 2004 (Cth) as part of the new Part VIB, which implements 
the Ipp Report’s recommendations in relation to actions for personal injury damages suffered by 
contraventions of the Trade Practices Act. Contrast Tasmania, where a child in the custody of a 
parent is not deemed to be not under a disability: Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) s 2(2)(a). 
10 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50F(3); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27J(3); and compare 
the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 87G(4). This restores the provision originally enacted in 
Victoria by the Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 23(1)(e). It is significant that because of the 
injustice caused by the 1958 provision, s 23(1)(e) was repealed by the Limitation of Actions 
(Personal Injury Claims) Act 1983 (Vic). The exclusion of the suspension in Tasmania in 1974 has 
not been repealed, nor has it been amended since the Ipp Report to provide for cases where the 
defendant is the child’s parent or a close associate of the child’s parent, or for cases where the 
child’s parent does not bring an action on behalf of the child.  
 The Victorian and Tasmanian incursions into the suspension of time for infants in 1958 and 1974 
respectively, and the revival of the incursion in Victoria and the adoption of it in New South Wales 
in 2002-03, replicate mid-twentieth century developments in the United Kingdom. Until those 
developments, for three centuries the limitation period for actions in trespass was suspended during 
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Wales, the action is primarily treated indifferently from any other and so must be 
brought within three years from when the action is discoverable.11 In Victoria, the 
action is accorded some distinction from those simply involving adults and must be 
brought within six years from when the action is discoverable.12 In both cases, a 
                                                                                                                                            
minority because an infant could not bring a claim and no other person was compelled to bring a 
claim on his or her behalf. This suspension of time was embodied in the Limitation Act 1623, 21 
Jac 1, c 16 s 7. The running of time was suspended for infants in other actions as well: see, for 
example, An Act for the Amendment of the Law and the Better Advancement of Justice 1705, 4 & 
5 Anne, c 16 s 18. However, the Public Authorities Protection Act 1893, 56 & 57 Vict, c 61 made 
an initial incursion into this general protection of infants by giving only six months to institute 
proceedings against persons acting in execution of statutory or public duties. The Limitation Act 
1939, 2 & 3 Geo 6, c 21 s 22(d) made the exclusion of the infancy extension against public 
authorities operate unless the injured child was not in the custody of a parent (this provision was 
duplicated in the New Zealand legislation: Limitation Act 1950 (NZ) s 24f). Section 22 of the 
Limitation Act 1939 (UK) otherwise embodied the 1623 provision, extending time from the date 
the disability ceased, which gave an injured minor six years from attaining majority to institute 
proceedings. A broader change occurred when the 1939 provision was expanded by the Law 
Reform (Limitation of Actions) Act 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz 2, c 36 s 2(2). This reform took the principle 
behind the ‘custody of a parent’ exclusion of the extension for cases against public authorities and 
applied it to all personal injury cases where a child was in the custody of a parent. However, this 
dramatic change was cancelled by the Limitation Act 1975 (UK) c 54 s 2. The Limitation Act 1980 
(UK) c 58 s 28(1) now restates the 1623 principle, suspending the running of time until the 
cessation of disability, with s 38(2) providing that an infant is a person under a disability. New 
Zealand’s duplication of the 1939 UK encroachment on the suspension of the running of time was 
also repealed in 1963: Limitation Amendment Act 1963 (NZ). For judicial remarks on the English 
developments, see Hewer v Bryant [1970] 1 QB 357 at 367-8 per Lord Denning MR, 370 per Sachs 
LJ; Todd v Davison [1972] AC 392 at 402-3 per Viscount Dilhorne, 409-12 per Lord Pearson; 
Tolley v Morris [1979] 2 All ER 561; and McDonnell v Congregation of Christian Brothers 
Trustees [2004] 1 All ER 641 at 644-9 per Lord Bingham. 
 Other Australian jurisdictions did not adopt Victoria’s 1958 strategy or Tasmania’s 1974 
enactment. In New South Wales, the position before 1969 essentially adopted the 1623 English 
legislation and the 1969 statute retained the suspension of time for infants. This was not changed 
until the 2002 amendments. In Queensland, the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 has not been 
changed in this respect and previous enactments retained the suspension of time for infants: 
Limitation Act 1960 (Qld) s 27; Limitation (Persons under Disabilities) Act 1962 s 2. In South 
Australia, the original 1936 provision which suspended time running during infancy (s 45) was 
preceded by another provision having the same effect: Limitation of Suits and Actions Act 1866 s 
47. The 1936 provision has not been amended since. In Western Australia, the 1935 statute 
suspended time for infants until infancy ceased and this has not been amended since (although the 
public authorities exception in s 47A giving one year from the cause of action’s accrual to institute 
proceedings was inserted by the Limitation Act Amendment Act 1954 (WA)). In the Australian 
Capital Territory, the original Limitation Ordinance 1985, no 66 (Cth) s 30(1) suspended time 
running during infancy and this has not been amended. Similarly, the Northern Territory suspended 
time for infants in the 1981 statute and this has not been amended; the position before 1981 adopted 
the 1623 English position. Although being beyond the scope of this article, which is primarily 
concerned with the special limitation period, the recent exclusion of the suspension of time during 
infancy in Victoria and New South Wales, and the exclusion of the suspension of time in Tasmania, 
deserves assessment. 
11 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50C(1)(a). 
12 Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27E(2)(a). Section 27D(2) makes it clear that the three-year 
post-discoverability limitation period that generally applies in personal injuries actions in Victoria 
under s 27D(1)(a) does not apply to actions where the injured person was under a disability, which 
includes being a child: s 3(2). Section 27E effectively creates a special limitation period for actions 
where the injured person is a child. 
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longstop of 12 years from the date of the wrongful acts applies, which is meant to 
work as an ultimate bar.13  
The abolition of the traditional suspension of the running of time during minority 
promotes recommendations made by the Ipp Report.14 The motive behind this 
development is to finalise legal proceedings as quickly as possible from the date of 
discoverability. This promotes the object of streamlining the civil litigation system to 
decrease public cost and to guard against insurance premium inflation. Some 
protection is offered to an adult survivor of injury sustained as a child in the event of a 
parent not instituting proceedings within time. In particular, the New South Wales 
legislation has an extension provision devoted to cases where there has been an 
irrational failure by a parent to bring an action for a minor, but this may only be of use 
in limited circumstances.15 Victoria lacks a comparable provision but still has a 
general extension provision that could be used by plaintiffs in this circumstance.16  
2. Ipp Report 
These developments exemplify the purpose of the Ipp Report, which had terms of 
reference to examine methods to reform the common law to limit liability and 
quantum of damages in civil proceedings.17 Within this brief, the Review Panel was 
required to develop and evaluate options for a uniform limitation period of three years 
for all persons.18 Given these terms of reference, and in light of the recommendations 
made to achieve those objects, the recommendations made by the Ipp Report about 
cases of injury to a child inflicted by a parent or close associate of a parent arguably 
constitute an even stronger endorsement than could otherwise be made by a 
sympathetic advocate of the reasons for enacting special provisions for certain classes 
of case.  
The Ipp Report recognised the unjustifiable difficulties posed by a standard 
limitation period in cases where a child is injured by a parent or a close associate of a 
parent.19 It recommended that a special limitation period be enacted to provide a 
justifiable period for plaintiffs to institute proceedings in these cases. The reasons for 
this recommendation were not thoroughly clarified, although there is a brief explicit 
                                                 
13 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50C(1)(b); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27E(2)(b). 
14 Ipp Report, above n 1, at 95-96 [6.48-6.51]. 
15 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 62D. There appear to be two demanding qualifications which must be 
met to enliven this extension. First, the parent must have irrationally failed to bring the action on 
the child’s behalf. In the second reading of the amending legislation, it was remarked that the 
irrationality extension provision will be more difficult to meet than an extension based on 
unreasonableness: New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 19 November 
2002 (Michael Egan, Treasurer, Minister of State Development and Vice-President of the Executive 
Council), at 6896ff. It is submitted that this extension provision should not be construed too 
severely; people should not suffer because of a parent’s omission to bring proceedings on their 
behalf. Second, under s 62D(2)(a) it must appear to the court that the limitation period ended before 
the child turned 19. This may restrict the availability of this extension provision in cases where, for 
example, the seriousness of the injury did not become apparent before this date, or where the child 
was very young when the abuse occurred. 
16 Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27K. 
17 Ipp Report, above n 1, at ix. 
18 Ibid, at x. 
19 Ibid, at 96-97 [6.52-6.55]. 
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reference to the ‘delayed psychological effect of sexual or other physical abuse’ as an 
example of a type of damage which must be considered when framing limitation 
provisions,20 and more significantly there is an express statement that the 
recommended strategy would ‘give plaintiffs a reasonable time to be free of the 
influence of the parent, guardian or potential defendant (as the case may be) before 
having to commence proceedings.’21 Although the Ipp Report did not fully explore 
the reasons for such a recommendation, there is an emerging body of literature – 
judicial and academic - that does detail the arguments for a limitation period in cases 
of child abuse that is longer than the standard time period.22 In addition, a number of 
jurisdictions elsewhere have abolished or amended limitation periods for these 
cases.23 
2.1 Qualitative differences in child abuse cases 
In sum, the argument proceeds from the recognition that there are qualitative 
differences in child abuse cases which distinguish them from other personal injuries 
cases, which make the generally sound policy reasons informing a standard limitation 
period less applicable. The policy reasons are that defendants have a right to a fair 
trial and need to be able to defend themselves with relatively fresh evidence, people 
should be able to proceed with their lives unencumbered by the threat of long-delayed 
claims, plaintiffs should not sleep on their rights, and the public has an interest in the 
prompt settlement of disputes.24 The references in the Ipp Report to the latent 
                                                 
20 Ibid, at 88 [6.11]. 
21 Ibid, at 96 [6.54]. 
22 See for example Thomas J in W v Attorney-General [1999] 2 NZLR 709, at 729-30; Atkinson J in 
Carter v Corporation of the Sisters of Mercy of the Diocese of Rockhampton [2001] QCA 335 
(Unreported, Queensland Court of Appeal, McPherson JA and Muir J; Atkinson J dissenting, 24 
August 2001) at [98]; see also the Canadian Supreme Court decision in M (K) v M (H) [1992] 3 
SCR 6, and obiter dicta in the European Court of Human Rights decision in Stubbings v United 
Kingdom (1996) Eur Ct HR Applications 22083/93; 22095/93, at [56]; and B Mathews, ‘Limitation 
periods and child sexual abuse cases: Law, psychology, time and justice’ (2003) 11(3) TLJ 218 at 
230-241; A Marfording, ‘Access to Justice for Survivors of Child Sexual Abuse’ (1997) 5 TLJ 221; 
L Bunney, ‘Limitation of Actions: Effect on Child Sexual Abuse Survivors in Queensland’ (1998) 
18 Queensland Lawyer 128; and J Mosher, ‘Challenging Limitation Periods: Civil Claims by Adult 
Survivors of Incest’ (1994) 44 University of Toronto Law Journal 169 at 176-181.  
23 British Columbia, Manitoba, Newfoundland, the Northwest Territories, Nova Scotia, Nunavut, 
Ontario, Saskatchewan and the Yukon have abolished time limits for civil actions based on sexual 
assault: Limitation Act, RSBC 1996, c 266, s 3(4)(k)(i); Limitation of Actions Act, CCSM 2002, c 
L150, s 2.1(2)(a) and (b); Limitations Act, RSNL 1995, c L-16.1, s 8(2); Limitation of Actions Act, 
RSNWT 1998, c L-8, s 2.1(2); Limitation of Actions Act, RSNS 1989, c 258, s 2(5)(a) and (b); 
Nunavut Act, SC 1993, c 28, s 29 – which adopts the Northwest Territories provisions; Limitations 
Act, RSO 2002, c 24, s 10(1)-(3); Limitation of Actions Act, RSS 1978, c L-15, s 3(1)(3.1)(a); 
Limitation of Actions Act, RSY 2002, c 139, s 2(3).  
 In Manitoba, the Northwest Territories, Nunavut, Ontario, and Saskatchewan, the abolition of time 
limits extends to all actions for trespass to the person, assault or battery where at the time of the 
injury the person was in a relationship of financial, emotional, physical or other dependency with 
one of the parties who caused the injury: Limitation of Actions Act, CCSM 2002, c L150, s 
2.1(2)(b)(ii); Limitation of Actions Act, RSNWT 1998, c L-8, s 2.1(1)-(2) (adopted in Nunavut: 
Nunavut Act, SC 1993, c 28, s 29); Limitations Act, RSO 2002, c 24, s 10(1)-(3); Limitation of 
Actions Act, RSS 1978, c L-15, s 3(1)(3.1)(b)(ii). 
24 Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 at 551ff; Ipp Report, 
above n 1, at 85-6 [6.1-6.3]. 
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psychological injuries typically occurring in cases of child sexual and physical abuse, 
and to the influence commonly exerted over the victim by the wrongdoer, which 
deters the institution of legal proceedings, are two of the most significant qualitative 
differences in these classes of case. 
The qualitative differences in child abuse cases as opposed to other personal injury 
cases flow from the nature of the acts and injuries involved. The differences discussed 
here apply in particular to cases of child sexual abuse, but, as the Ipp Report observed, 
they are also amenable to at least some cases of child physical abuse. The loss of 
evidence argument is affected by the facts that typically the acts occur in private and 
so are rarely accompanied by objective evidence, and the acts are often kept secret. 
The sleeping on rights argument is undermined by the fact that the injury is inflicted 
on a child, who is incapable of bringing proceedings independently. In addition to 
this, a typical plaintiff in this class of case will not know of the nature and extent of 
his or her injury, or its cause, until long after attaining majority. This knowledge 
typically only arises from psychiatric diagnosis.25 Even when this knowledge is 
obtained, many survivors will still not feel capable of instituting legal proceedings.26 
Survivors of child abuse often have a misplaced sense of guilt, shame and 
responsibility for the acts which impedes their realisation of being the victim of a 
wrong.27 These misplaced feelings are factors contributing to some survivors’ 
inability to ever disclose the events, and, where the survivor is able to eventually 
disclose, in the amount of time taken to do so.28 As well, in cases of familial abuse, 
the wrongdoer’s position of superiority can work as an even more potent 
                                                 
25 As happened in cases including Calder v Uzelac [2003] VSCA 175 (Unreported, Victoria Court of 
Appeal, Buchanan and Chernov JJA and Ashley AJA, 14 November 2003); Applications 861 and 
864 (Unreported, District Court of Queensland, Botting DCJ, 21 June 2002); and Hopkins v State of 
Queensland [2004] QDC 021 (Unreported, McGill DCJ, 24 February 2004). 
26 The reluctance to take legal action will often be linked with the survivor having post-traumatic 
stress disorder, one symptom of which involves the person avoiding stimuli associated with the 
traumatic events, including the thoughts and actions required to institute legal proceedings. For 
evidence about PTSD in survivors of child sexual abuse in both childhood and adulthood, see for 
example S McLeer, E Deblinger, M Atkins, E Foa and D Ralphe, ‘Post-traumatic stress disorder in 
sexually abused children’ (1988) 27 Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent 
Psychiatry 650; S McLeer, E Deblinger, D Henry and H Orvaschel, ‘Sexually abused children at 
high risk for post-traumatic stress disorder’ (1992) 31 Journal of the American Academy of Child 
and Adolescent Psychiatry 875; P Ackerman, J Newton, W McPherson, J Jones and R Dykman, 
‘Prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder and other psychiatric diagnoses in three groups of 
abused children (sexual, physical, and both)’ (1998) 22 Child Abuse and Neglect 759; S McLeer, J 
Dixon, D Henry et al, ‘Psychopathology in non-clinically referred sexually abused children’ (1998) 
37 Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 1326; P Mullen, ‘Impact 
of Sexual and Physical Abuse on Women’s Mental Health’ (1988) The Lancet 16 April; J Stein, J 
Golding, J Siegel, M Burnam and S Sorensen ‘Long-term psychological sequelae of child sexual 
abuse’ (1988) 27 Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 650; and P 
Mullen, ‘Childhood Sexual Abuse and Mental Health in Adult Life’ (1993) 163 British Journal of 
Psychiatry 721.  
27 Queensland Crime Commission and Queensland Police Service, Project AXIS – Child Sexual Abuse 
in Queensland: The Nature and Extent, 2000, Brisbane, at 88, citing K Bussey and E Grimbeek, 
‘Disclosure Processes: issues for child sexual abuse victims’, in K Rotenberg (Ed), Disclosure 
Processes in Children and Adolescents, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
28 In Queensland, the Project Axis survey found that of 212 adult survivors of child sexual abuse, 25 
took 5-9 years to disclose it, 33 took 10-19 years, and 51 took over 20 years: ibid, at 84 (Table 23). 
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psychological deterrent from proceeding.29 The public interest argument in this 
context actually should work in favour of a long limitation period because the acts are 
particularly egregious, and because a significant number of perpetrators are likely to 
commit the acts against other individuals. The heinous nature of the acts also works 
against the principle that people should not live with the threat of delayed claims.30  
The Ipp Report recommended that where a child is injured by a parent, guardian or 
a person in a close relationship with the parent or guardian, the limitation period 
should only start to run when the plaintiff turns 25.31 In such cases, the limitation 
period should be three years.32 A person would be in a ‘close relationship’ with the 
child’s parent or guardian if the parent or guardian might be influenced by the 
potential defendant not to bring a claim on behalf of the child; or if the minor might 
be unwilling to disclose to the parent or guardian the nature of the actions that 
allegedly caused the damage.33 Since in some of these cases the date of 
discoverability may not occur until after expiry of this period, the court should have 
discretion at any time to extend the limitation period to the expiry of a period of three 
years from the date of discoverability.34  
3. Legislative changes in New South Wales and Victoria 
Responding to the Ipp Report, legislatures in New South Wales and Victoria enacted a 
special limitation period for cases where a child is injured by a parent or a close 
associate of a parent. Although similar, the changes made are not identical to those 
envisaged by the Ipp Report. The changes apply to injuries sustained after 
commencement of the relevant provisions.35 
In New South Wales, s 50E creates a special limitation period for minors injured 
by close ‘relatives’, which is a somewhat misleading term. The comparable Victorian 
provision, s 27I, is entitled ‘Special limitation period for minors injured by close 
relatives or close associates’, and this description seems more accurate. Apart from 
this difference, and some apparently inconsequential variations in wording, the two 
provisions are identical. 
The provisions state that in these cases, the action is discoverable by the victim 
when he or she turns 25 years of age, or when the cause of action is actually 
                                                 
29 Where the perpetrator is a relative, it is even more likely that the delay in disclosure (much less the 
ability to commence civil proceedings) will be long. An analysis of Queensland Police Service data 
from 1994-1998 found that of 3721 reported offences committed by relatives, 25.5% of survivors 
took 1-5 years to report the acts; 9.7% took 5-10 years; 18.2% took 10-20 years, and 14.2% took 
more than 20 years: ibid, at 86 (Table 25). In contrast, of the 1058 cases where the offender was not 
known to the complainant, 27.4% reported the offence within a week, 34.4% reported it within 1-4 
weeks, and a further 18.5% reported it within 1-6 months: ibid. 
30 For more detailed explanation, see Mathews, above n 22.  
31 Ipp Report, above n 1, at 96 [6.54]. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid, at 96 [6.52]. 
34 Ibid, at 97 [6.55]. 
35 In New South Wales, to injuries sustained on or after 6 December 2002; and in Victoria, to injuries 
sustained on or after 21 May 2003. 
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discoverable, whichever is later.36 The longstop period of 12 years runs from when 
the victim turns 25,37 hence ending when the victim turns 37. The stipulation of actual 
discoverability is significant because it rules out any possibility of an argument by a 
defendant based on constructive discoverability; that is, an argument that a plaintiff’s 
time period started to run from when it could be argued that the plaintiff ought to have 
known of the three discoverability factors. Such arguments about what a survivor of 
child abuse ought to have known, and when that person ought to have known 
particular facts related to discoverability and hence ought to have instituted 
proceedings, have been successfully used by defendants to defeat applications for 
extensions of time.38 If the time period here ran from discoverability whether actual or 
constructive, rather than running only from actual discoverability, much of the benefit 
of the special limitation period could be lost.  
This means that in this class of case, a plaintiff who has turned 25 has three years 
to institute proceedings once he or she has actual knowledge of the facts of the injury, 
of the defendant causing that injury, and of the injury being of sufficient seriousness 
that it justifies legal action. Effectively then, a plaintiff here can have until turning 37 
to institute proceedings. On the basis of the passage of time, a plaintiff could only be 
prevented from bringing an action within this 12 year period if it can be shown by a 
defendant that a plaintiff had actual knowledge of the three discoverability factors at a 
date more than three years before the plaintiff actually instituted proceedings. This is 
a significant widening of time for plaintiffs in this context. 
3.1 The close associate provision 
Apart from the subset of cases that arise from injury caused by a parent or guardian, a 
large part of the ambit of the provision will turn on the interpretation of the definition 
of ‘close associate’. A ‘close associate’ of a parent or guardian of the victim is defined 
as:39 
a person whose relationship with the parent or guardian is such that: 
(a) the parent or guardian might be influenced by the person not to bring an action on behalf of 
the victim; or  
                                                 
36 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50E(1)(a); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27I(1)(a); compare 
the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 87K(1). 
37 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50E(1)(b); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27I(1)(b). 
38 Applications for extensions of time in personal injury cases including those involving child abuse 
are technically available in most but not all Australian jurisdictions, based on the claim that the 
plaintiff has only recently discovered material facts decisive to the case after expiry of the time 
period: Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) ss 58, 60A, 60G, 62A and 62D; Limitation of Actions Act 
1974 (Qld) s 31; Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) s 48; Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) ss 
23A and 27K; Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) s 36; Limitation Act 1981 (NT) s 44. However, even 
where an extension provision exists, an application can be defeated by judicial findings about the 
knowledge the applicant is perceived to have already possessed of his or her injuries, and by 
expectations about when it was reasonable for him or her to have instituted proceedings: see for 
example Hopkins, above n 25; Applications 861 and 864, above n 25; and Carter, above n 22; 
contrast Johnson v Director of Community Services (Vic) [2000] Aust Torts Reports 81-540; 
McGuinness v Clark (Unreported, County Court of Victoria, Duckett J, 7 May 2003); SD v 
Director-General of Community Welfare Services (Vic) (2001) 27 Fam LR 695; Woodhead v 
Elbourne [2001] 1 Qd R 220; and Tiernan v Tiernan (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, 
Byrne J, 22 April 1993). 
39 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50E(2); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27I(2): author’s 
emphasis. The comparable provision in the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) is s 87K(2). 
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(b) the victim might be unwilling to disclose to the parent or guardian the act resulting in the 
injury.  
Parliamentary debates in New South Wales indicate that the primary function of 
the special time limitation provision is to create an ‘important exception’ for cases of 
child abuse.40 The definition of close associate appears to represent two justifications 
for extending the special time period beyond wrongdoing parents and guardians alone. 
The first limb embodies the possibility that the wrongdoer’s identity can dissuade a 
child’s parent from bringing an action on behalf of the child against the wrongdoer, 
even if the parent possesses knowledge of the events, the child’s injury, and the 
seriousness of the child’s injuries.  
The second limb appears to embody the situation where because of the 
wrongdoer’s identity, the child might be dissuaded from disclosing the events. If 
conceptually limited to this identity-related rationale, as suggested by the Ipp Report’s 
reference to the rationale for the provision being to give a plaintiff time to be free of 
the wrongdoer’s influence, the second limb may be too narrow since a major reason 
for a child not disclosing sexual abuse is not simply the identity of the abuser, but the 
nature of the acts and the nature of any feelings about those acts the child may either 
have by himself or herself, or which have been imposed on the child.  
However, the breadth of coverage in practice of the close associate concept 
remains to be seen. One matter determining the extent of its use is the raw number of 
cases of child sexual abuse. This will be discussed in Part 4.1 of this article, but at this 
point it is useful to observe that the number of cases may well be more than the ‘very 
few cases’ anticipated in Parliamentary debates. Another factor relevant to the use of 
the close associate provision depends on the scope of its construction. Will the close 
associate provision be capable of including wrongdoers such as priests, teachers, 
scoutmasters, de facto partners of the child’s mother, grandparents, and sports 
coaches? In both limbs of the definition, the phrase ‘might be’ suggests a broad ambit, 
being conceptually more inclusive than descriptors such as ‘is’. Moreover, since this 
special limitation period is a remedial provision, it should be interpreted beneficially 
in the event of any ambiguity.41 Therefore, in the context of the second limb, it seems 
reasonable to argue that in cases where a child is unwilling to disclose the abuse 
because of the wrongdoer’s identity and relationship with the child’s parent, or 
because of an unwillingness to disclose the abuse for some reason connected with the 
nature of the acts and the nature of any feelings produced by those acts, the victim 
should receive the benefit of the close associate special provision. If construed only 
by reference to the identity of the wrongdoer, and if this construction negates the 
operation of the provision in cases where the child feels unwilling to disclose the acts 
because of the nature of them rather than because the child perceives a close 
relationship between the wrongdoer and his or her parent, the close associate 
provision could be framed too narrowly. It is useful to explore the operation of the 
provision in two circumstances to ascertain its ambit and outcome, and to compare 
this with other jurisdictions. 
                                                 
40 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, above n 15, at 6896ff: ‘There will be very few cases that 
fall within this important exception. In the main, this exception will be used when a child has been 
the victim of abuse.’ 
41 Bull v Attorney-General (NSW) (1913) 17 CLR 370 at 384. 
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3.2 Operation of special limitation period: child injured by a parent or close associate 
Purely from the perspective of gaining access to civil courts, the optimum situation in 
New South Wales and Victoria for a survivor of child abuse is if the wrongdoer was a 
parent or ‘close associate’ of a parent. Suppose that a plaintiff, referred to here as ‘X’, 
is 10 years old when his father sexually abuses him. Since X was a minor at the time 
of the act, and since the cause of action is against X’s parent, then the action is 
discoverable when X turns 25, or when it is actually discoverable, whichever is later, 
and the 12 year longstop runs from when X turns 25. The cause of action will be 
actually discoverable when X actually knows that the injury has occurred; the injury 
was caused by the defendant; and the injury was sufficiently serious to justify 
bringing an action. Time will expire for X three years after X actually knows these 
three facts, provided he has turned 25. Since the 12 year longstop runs from when X 
turns 25, it will end when he turns 37. This means that X potentially has until he turns 
37 to bring the action.  
If X knows the three factors when he turns 24, then the action is still deemed not 
discoverable until he is 25 so he will still have until he turns 28 to bring the action. If 
X knows the three factors when he turns 28, then he has until he turns 31 to 
commence proceedings. If X knows the three factors when he turns 34, 35 or 36, then 
he has until he turns 37 because of the longstop.  
If X does not know the three factors by the time he turns 37, time will have run 
out. His option to attempt to enliven the claim then is to apply under s 62A for an 
extension of the longstop. Under that provision, the court may, if it decides it is just 
and reasonable to do so, extend the longstop for whatever period it determines, 
provided that the extension will not extend the limitation period beyond three years 
from when the action was discoverable by the plaintiff. In deciding whether to extend 
the longstop, under s 62B(1) the court must consider all the circumstances of the case, 
and must consider the length of the delay, reasons for the delay, prejudice to the 
defendant through loss of evidence, the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injury, 
anything the defendant did to induce the plaintiff’s delay in proceeding, the steps 
taken by the plaintiff to obtain expert advice and the nature of any such advice 
received, and the time when the action was discoverable by the plaintiff.  
If X resides in Victoria, this entire scenario will work the same way. As well, the 
situation if the longstop expires will also be similar, with the extension provision in 
Victoria, s 27K, being essentially the same as s 62A. In Victoria, the factors that the 
court must consider on an application for an extension of time are set out in s 27L, 
and these too are largely the same as the New South Wales counterparts. However, s 
27L(1)(f) creates one clear difference, with the court being directed to consider ‘the 
extent to which the plaintiff acted promptly and reasonably’ once the plaintiff knew 
that the act of the defendant ‘might be capable at that time of giving rise to an action 
for damages’. This subsection could form the focus of many defence arguments 
against the granting of an extension. Depending on interpretation and application of 
this provision, this may make the situation more difficult in Victoria than New South 
Wales, if courts were to have demanding expectations about the promptness and 
reasonableness of plaintiffs’ actions once they know an act ‘might’ be capable of 
giving rise to an action for damages.  
Access to the courts is therefore much changed for plaintiffs in child abuse cases in 
these two jurisdictions, at least where the wrongdoer is a parent or falls within the 
close associate definition. The adult survivor of child abuse will at a minimum have 
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until he or she turns 28 to institute proceedings, and, arguably, in many cases will 
effectively have until 37. These citizens therefore will have much more time than do 
their counterparts elsewhere in Australia (apart from Western Australia), who under 
current provisions have until turning 21 to institute proceedings. If X lived in these 
jurisdictions and did not commence proceedings by the time he turned 21, he would 
have to rely on a successful application for an extension of time. Extensions of time 
are technically available in most jurisdictions where a plaintiff discovers decisive 
material facts relevant to the action after expiry of time,42 but gaining an extension in 
child abuse cases is frequently difficult,43 particularly if a long period of time has 
elapsed from the date of the events.44 A clear example of this difference is that in the 
Queensland case of Hopkins, the applicant alleged sexual abuse by her foster father 
but could not bring her case within time and made an application for an extension 
aged 28, which was refused.45 If the plaintiff in Hopkins was governed by these new 
provisions, she would have been entitled as of right to bring the claim. The contrast 
between New South Wales and Victoria on one hand, and Western Australia and 
Tasmania on the other, is even more marked, because there is no extension provision 
in Western Australia, and only a limited provision in Tasmania.46 
The operation of the special limitation period is fairly clear when the wrongdoer is 
a parent. However, the question of whether a wrongdoer is a close associate is not as 
concrete. Because of the consequences for litigants flowing from whether the 
wrongdoer is classed as a close associate or not, there may be some disputes about 
whether a particular wrongdoer falls within the definition or remains outside it. 
3.3 Operation of special limitation period: child injured by a wrongdoer who is not a 
parent or close associate 
Suppose that on the date that another plaintiff, referred to here as ‘Y’, turns 10, her 
mother’s boyfriend (‘Z’) sexually abuses her. She tells her mother about the abuse and 
she has indicators of it, such as being upset, anxious, and not wanting to be left alone 
with Z. The time limit depends on whether Y’s mother’s boyfriend falls within the 
definition of a close associate. If the mother’s boyfriend is a close associate, then the 
special time period will apply and the outcomes of X’s situation will be duplicated, 
giving Y effectively until 37 to bring her claim. If not, the outcome is much different. 
3.3.1 Characterizing a wrongdoer as a close associate 
Depending on the facts of each case, when applying each limb of the definition the 
mother’s boyfriend Z may or may not be classed as a close associate. The provision 
regarding the definition of close associate seems to turn on the identity of the 
wrongdoer and its effect on the parent’s willingness to bring proceedings (the first 
limb); and in the second limb, the effect of the wrongdoer’s identity on the victim’s 
                                                 
42 See above n 38. 
43 As found in Carter, above n 22; Applications 861 and 864, above n 25; and Hopkins, above n 25. 
44 This is because the court retains discretion to refuse to extend time based on the prejudice to the 
defendant perceived to arise through the lapse of time: see for example Calder, above n 25; Carter, 
above n 22; and Applications 861 and 864, above n 25. 
45 Hopkins, above n 25 
46 The Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) s 5(3) does not enable an extension of time beyond six years from 
the date the cause of action accrued. 
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willingness to disclose the events, rather than the effect of the nature of the acts on 
this willingness to disclose. 
Addressing the first limb, and assuming for this purpose that Y has told her mother 
about the abuse, if Y’s mother is in love with Z and harbours strong hopes about the 
continuation and development of their relationship, or if for some other reason her 
behaviour is strongly influenced by Z, he will be a close associate if this means that 
Y’s mother ‘might be’ influenced by Z not to bring an action on Y’s behalf. Equally, 
even if these circumstances exist, they might not actually dissuade Y’s mother from 
bringing an action, and if this is the case then counsel for Z would argue that he is not 
a close associate. Alternatively, suppose that Y’s mother had not known Z for long 
and the relationship was not serious. In this case, if Z had no capacity to directly 
influence Y’s mother about whether or not to take legal action, then Z would not be a 
close associate under the first limb.  
Even so, under the second limb of the definition, Z in any of these circumstances 
may be classed as a close associate if Y feels unwilling to disclose the events. If Y 
was unwilling to disclose because of her perception of Z’s relationship with her 
mother, then Z should be classed as a close associate. However, depending on 
interpretation of the provision, if Y feels unwilling to disclose not because of Z’s 
identity or his relationship with her mother, but because of the nature of the acts and 
her feelings about them, on a very narrow interpretation this may result in Z not being 
classed as a close associate. It is submitted that this interpretation is unjustifiable 
when compared with the purpose of the provision. 
It is clearly advantageous for a plaintiff to successfully argue that the wrongdoer 
was a close associate, since the effect is to suspend time until turning 25 and 
possessing actual discoverability, and this can operate to mean that the victim 
effectively has until 37 to institute proceedings. The alternative – if the wrongdoer is 
not a close associate – is that time runs from the victim’s parent’s discoverability, 
whether actual or constructive, and even if the action is not discoverable (for example, 
through non-disclosure and no other circumstance creating knowledge on the parent’s 
part) then time will expire on the date 12 years after the events. This different 
outcome will be replicated if instead of the wrongdoer in the hypothetical scenario 
being Y’s mother’s boyfriend, it is Y’s parish priest, maths teacher, swimming coach 
or friend’s father who is deemed not to be a close associate. Because of these 
contrasts in the running of time, it is anticipated that defendants will argue for a 
narrow interpretation of who constitutes a close associate in cases such as the example 
outlined above, and plaintiffs will argue for a broader construction. 
If the wrongdoer is not found to be a close associate, then since Y is in the custody 
of a capable parent, she is deemed not to be under a disability. Because she is not 
under a disability, the limitation period is not suspended and in New South Wales the 
standard time period will apply. This means that the action must be brought within 
three years of discoverability, or within 12 years of the event, whichever is first to 
expire. The situation in Victoria is identical except instead of three years post-
discoverability, the parent will have six years post-discoverability.47 
The question then becomes: when was Y’s action discoverable? In determining 
this, the facts that are known or ought to be known by Y’s capable parent are taken to 
                                                 
47 Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27E(2)(a). 
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be the facts known or which ought to be known by Y. This means that if the parent 
knows of the injury, of the defendant causing it, and of the sufficient seriousness of 
the injury, then the action must be brought within three years of the possession of this 
knowledge. This also means that if it is deemed that the parent ought to have known 
of the three facts by a certain date, then the action must be brought within three years 
of that date (or six in Victoria). It will be deemed that Y’s mother ought to have 
known a fact at a particular time if the fact would have been ascertained by her if she 
had taken all reasonable steps by that time to ascertain the fact.  
3.3.2 If the action is actually discoverable 
If the parent actually knows the three facts, then the parent must bring the action 
within three years of the date on which that actual knowledge exists (or six in 
Victoria). Therefore, if the child tells the parent about the abuse and the parent 
investigates and ascertains that the child was injured due to the defendant’s fault and 
the injury is sufficiently serious to justify proceeding, then the three-year period 
operates from the date of that knowledge (or six in Victoria). In this example, if Y 
disclosed the abuse to her mother immediately then an action would have to be 
brought by Y’s mother on Y’s behalf within three years (or six in Victoria): that is, by 
the time Y turned 13, or if in Victoria, 16. This is a much narrower time period than 
would occur in other Australian jurisdictions. 
Similarly, if Y was 7, or 13, or 16 when the abuse occurred and the disclosure was 
made, and her mother had actual knowledge of the defendant’s abuse and of the fact 
that the injury was of sufficient seriousness to justify bringing an action, then the 
action would have to be commenced within three years: that is, by the time the child 
turned 10, 16 or 19 respectively, or, if in Victoria, by 13, 19 or 22. Again, this is a 
much tighter time period than exists in other jurisdictions. This places a heavy onus 
on parents who may know about the act (or some part of it), but who might not 
appreciate the seriousness of the consequences. 
3.3.3 If the action is constructively discoverable 
If the parent does not actually know the three facts, the question then may arise: ought 
the parent to have known the three facts? That is, did the parent have constructive 
knowledge? This will be a problematic area if, for example, the child does not 
disclose. Since there could be a large difference between the date time expired based 
on constructive discoverability, and the date time will expire through application of 
the longstop, defendants may attempt to demonstrate that the victim’s parent ought to 
have known the three discoverability factors. For example, if Y began exhibiting a 
number of overt signs of having been abused – for example, through sexualised play, 
self-harming, and extreme anxiety – a defendant may argue that this should have put 
Y’s parent on notice that something had happened to Y sufficient to require the parent 
to find out what exactly had occurred. If constructive discoverability is argued to have 
crystallised by the time Y turned 11, for example, then time would expire three years 
from that date: by the time Y turned 14 (or if in Victoria, 17). In contrast, if in this 
circumstance it was decided that the action was not discoverable, then the longstop 
would operate and time would expire 12 years after the event, which is when Y turns 
22.  
For reasons similar to those that motivate the argument that the close associate 
provision should not be read too narrowly, it is submitted that an argument about a 
parent’s constructive discoverability should not be accepted unless there is very clear 
evidence that the child’s parent ought to have known of the three discoverability 
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factors in a case of child sexual abuse. Child victims frequently do not disclose the 
abuse, and abused children may exhibit few or only vague signs of abuse that may be 
explicable on other less sinister grounds. Because of the concealment of the acts and 
the fact that the consequences may be difficult to link to any obvious causal factor, in 
many cases there may be no blame that can reasonably be attached to a parent for not 
knowing what is happening to his or her child, particularly if the child is older. As 
well as these arguments about a fair interpretation of constructive discoverability 
based on what is reasonable to require of a parent, there is the effect of such steep 
expectations to consider. An abused child should not be visited with the consequences 
of a harsh expectation of what a parent ought to have known and done. Again, 
because these provisions are remedial, they should be interpreted beneficially.48 
Alternatively, there may be situations where a strong case for constructive 
discoverability is made out. If, for example, a child discloses the abuse to the parent 
and is clearly suffering serious injury from the effects of the abuse but the parent does 
not believe the child or does not make investigations, without any good reason for 
such disbelief or inactivity, then such a parent may more justifiably be argued to have 
had constructive knowledge. A finding of constructive discoverability would activate 
the three-year period (six in Victoria) in which the parent is expected by the 
legislation to institute proceedings on behalf of the child. This is the type of situation 
that the New South Wales provision enabling an extension of time for a parent’s 
irrational failure to act is intended for. While this provision lacks a Victorian 
counterpart, it is submitted that in equivalent circumstances in Victoria, an outcome 
should be reached in a normal extension of time application that would mirror the 
result if the application were brought in New South Wales. 
3.3.4 If the action is not discoverable: application of the longstop 
If it is found that the action was not discoverable, then the longstop will apply, ending 
the time period 12 years after the event. In the example of Y, if she did not disclose 
the abuse then the action would not be actually discoverable, and assuming the action 
was also not constructively discoverable, then the longstop would cause time to expire 
when Y turns 22. By itself, the application of the longstop could produce extremely 
narrow time limits, and would produce results much different even to the current 
situation in other Australian jurisdictions. If a child is aged 6 when the injury is 
inflicted, and if the parent lacks actual or constructive knowledge, the longstop will 
make the time limit end 12 years from the date of the event, so the longstop will make 
time expire when the child turns 18. 
The only option for a plaintiff in this situation to enliven the action is to apply for 
an extension of the longstop under s 62A. However, the ultimate bar in New South 
Wales of 30 years will mean that even this avenue is closed, for Y, by the time she 
turns 40; and if a child is injured at age 6, by the time that child turns 36.49 Such 
results may be unjust, and may produce other jurisdictional differences. There is no 
similar ultimate bar in the Victorian statute. 
It is likely that in many cases that are not discoverable by the parent, the longstop 
period of 12 years from the date of the act will operate. This will mean that 
                                                 
48 Bull, above n 41. 
49 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 51. 
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applications for extensions of time will determine some applicants’ access to courts.50 
In these applications, judicial findings about what is just and reasonable will be 
decisive,51 and these findings may often depend on the court’s conclusion about what 
conduct was reasonable to expect of the survivor of the abuse.52 In particular, the 
question of whether it was reasonable to expect that the survivor institute proceedings 
before he or she actually did so may often determine the extension application. To 
arrive at justifiable conclusions about this question, judicial reasoning needs to be 
adequately informed by psychological and psychiatric evidence about the effects of 
child sexual abuse on survivors in general, and the effects of the abuse in the 
particular applicant’s case. 
4. Contrast with other States 
The new special limitation period for cases where a child is injured by a parent or a 
close associate of a parent suspends the running of time until the adult survivor of 
child abuse turns 25, and may effectively give many people in these cases until 
turning 37, provided that a plaintiff does not fail to bring proceedings within three 
years of actual discoverability. This gives plaintiffs in New South Wales and Victoria 
a far longer period of time in which to bring a civil action than is conferred by 
limitations statutes in the rest of Australia, which generally give plaintiffs until 
turning 21 to institute proceedings (save Western Australia and Tasmania), regardless 
of the knowledge they have about their case. If a plaintiff in one of these jurisdictions 
fails to commence proceedings within time, then in most but not all States, an 
extension of time is technically possible in some circumstances, and even if these 
circumstances are satisfied, the application for an extension may be denied, hence 
barring access to the courts. 
The new provisions will benefit a significant number of plaintiffs in New South 
Wales and Victoria. Exactly how many people will benefit is impossible to predict, 
but by referring to recent statistics on substantiated cases of child abuse in various 
jurisdictions, we can see that there is a substantial number of people to whom these 
provisions will be directly relevant. The corollary of this is that the absence of similar 
amendments in other Australian jurisdictions will also assume significance, since a 
failure to enact similar provisions in these jurisdictions will create a situation where 
plaintiffs in some States will be enabled to bring civil proceedings under certain 
conditions, while plaintiffs in identical circumstances in other jurisdictions will be 
barred from access to civil courts. The statistics about the raw numbers of child sexual 
abuse substantiations do not inform us about the number of cases in these statistics 
where the wrongdoer was a parent or a close associate of a parent. However, two 
recent investigations into the relationship between victims and offenders demonstrate 
that the incidence of abuse by family members and other individuals who are known 
to the child (and who may therefore fall within the close associate definition) easily 
                                                 
50 In New South Wales, the victim may apply for an extension of the longstop under the Limitation 
Act 1969 (NSW) s 62A; in Victoria, the applicant can apply for an extension of time under the 
Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27K. 
51 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 62A(2); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27K(2)(b). 
52 The provisions enabling this assessment of the person’s conduct include the Limitation Act 1969 
(NSW) s 62B(1)(e) and (f); and Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27L(f) and (g). 
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outnumber those cases where the wrongdoer is a stranger or is otherwise unlikely to 
qualify as a close associate.53 
4.1 Potential numerical significance of legislative changes: the incidence of child abuse 
It is generally accepted that child abuse is an underreported phenomenon, but even the 
available statistics of its incidence suggest that these provisions have the potential to 
affect significant numbers of people throughout Australia. In New South Wales in 
2002-03 there were 109,498 notifications of child abuse and neglect to State 
authorities, involving 66,503 children.54 Of these, there were 16,765 substantiated 
cases involving 11,534 children.55 Of the 16,765 substantiations, 2427 were cases of 
sexual abuse.56 In Victoria in 2002-03 there were 37,635 notifications of child abuse 
and neglect to State authorities, involving 28,421 children.57 Of these, there were 
7287 substantiated cases involving 6846 children.58 Of the 7287 substantiations, 562 
were cases of sexual abuse.59 In these two States in one year, then, there were 2989 
child victims of sexual abuse. 
Other jurisdictions have smaller numbers of reported substantiations due in part to 
their smaller populations. In Queensland in 2002-03 there were 31,068 notifications 
of child abuse and neglect to State authorities, involving 22,027 children.60 Of these, 
there were 12,203 substantiated cases involving 9032 children.61 Of the 12,203 
substantiations, 610 were cases of sexual abuse.62 The numbers of substantiated cases 
of child abuse are even smaller in Western Australia (243), South Australia (180), 
Tasmania (61), the ACT (21) and the Northern Territory (33), but they are still 
                                                 
53 In Queensland, the Project Axis survey in 2000 of 104 survivors of child sexual abuse (which 
involved 211 offenders) found that 108 offenders (51.2%) were family members of the abused 
child; 36 offenders (17.1%) were a family friend; 16 offenders (7.6%) were strangers; 15 offenders 
(7.1%) were clergy; 3 offenders (1.4%) were guardians or foster parents; 6 offenders (2.8%) were 
teachers; and 27 offenders (12.8%) were in none of these classes: Queensland Crime Commission 
and Queensland Police Service, above n 27, at 56 (Table 8). Also in Queensland, a Criminal Justice 
Commission analysis of Queensland Police data regarding the relationship of offenders to 
complainants in reported child sex offences shows that over the two years from 1997-98, out of 
8504 offences, only 686 (8%) were committed by strangers, and 3046 (35.8%) were committed by 
relatives. A further 1158 (13.6%) were committed by acquaintances (including family friends, 
housemates, neighbours and new acquaintances), and 315 (3.7%) were committed by professionals 
(including teachers, careers and foster parents): ibid, at 56 (Table 7). 
54 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Child protection Australia 2002-03, Canberra, 
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2004, 17 (Table 2.6). 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid, at 16 (Table 2.5). The 16 765 substantiations comprised 5435 of physical abuse; 2427 of 
sexual abuse; 5582 of emotional abuse; 3263 of neglect; and 58 children identified as being at high 
risk but with no identifiable injury or harm. 
57 Ibid, at 17 (Table 2.6). 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid, at 16 (Table 2.5). The 7287 substantiations comprised 1787 of physical abuse; 562 of sexual 
abuse; 3202 of emotional abuse; and 1736 of neglect. 
60 Ibid, at 17 (Table 2.6). 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid, at 16 (Table 2.5). The 12,203 substantiations comprised 2806 of physical abuse; 610 of sexual 
abuse; 4135 of emotional abuse; and 4652 of neglect. 
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significant.63 Altogether, in a twelve month period from 2002-03 throughout 
Australia, there were 198,355 notifications of child abuse and neglect, with 40,416 
substantiated cases, containing 4137 substantiated notifications of child sexual abuse. 
Individual wrongdoers are not the only possible future target of litigation. 
Queensland has a history of child sexual abuse in State and religious institutions and 
in State foster care.64 It is possible that the 2003 Commonwealth Senate Inquiry into 
children in institutional care will reveal similar records of institutional abuse, which 
could hold implications for State and institutional future liabilities.65 It is also possible 
that an inquiry in South Australia may have similar results.66 The statistics cited here 
about the incidence of child sexual abuse, and the evidence cited about the proportion 
of offenders who are family members of the victim or who are otherwise known to the 
child and who therefore may satisfy the close associate definition, demonstrate that 
there probably are not ‘very few’ cases to which the special limitation period is 
potentially important, but a significant number. This remains so even when accepting 
that many instances of child abuse are never revealed, and that many survivors will 
either be unable to ever bring proceedings, or unwilling to do so even if 
accommodating legal provisions exist. 
4.2 Reasons for substantial uniformity across jurisdictions 
There are several reasons why there should not be disparities between limitation 
periods in child abuse cases within Australian jurisdictions. First, as a matter of 
justice, there should not be significant inequalities between jurisdictions in access to 
                                                 
63 In Western Australia there were 2293 notifications of child abuse and neglect to State authorities, 
involving 2152 children. Of these, there were 888 substantiated cases involving 847 children. Of 
the 888 substantiations, 243 were cases of sexual abuse. In South Australia there were 13,442 
notifications of child abuse and neglect to State authorities, involving 9288 children. Of these, there 
were 2423 substantiated cases involving 1908 children. Of the 2423 substantiations, 180 were cases 
of sexual abuse. In Tasmania there were 741 notifications of child abuse and neglect to State 
authorities, involving 540 children. Of these, there were 213 substantiated cases involving 208 
children. Of the 213 substantiations, 61 were cases of sexual abuse. In the ACT there were 2124 
notifications of child abuse and neglect to State authorities, involving 1512 children. Of these, there 
were 310 substantiated cases involving 266 children. Of the 310 substantiations, 21 were cases of 
sexual abuse. In the Northern Territory there were 1554 notifications of child abuse and neglect to 
State authorities, involving 1340 children. Of these, there were 327 substantiated cases involving 
312 children. Of the 327 substantiations, 33 were cases of sexual abuse: ibid, at 16-17 (Tables 2.5 
and 2.6). 
64 An extensive history of child abuse and neglect in Queensland institutions was found by the Forde 
Commission of Inquiry into Abuse of Children in Queensland Institutions, 1999, Brisbane, 
<http://www.families.qld.gov.au/department/forde/publications/documents/pdf/forde_comminquiry
.pdf> at 10 August 2004; and records of child abuse and neglect occurring in foster care were even 
more recently found by the Crime And Misconduct Commission inquiry entitled Protecting 
Children: An Inquiry Into Abuse Of Children In Foster Care, 2004, Crime and Misconduct 
Commission, Brisbane, 
<http://www.cmc.qld.gov.au/library/CMCWEBSITE/ProtectingChildren.pdf> at 10 August 2004.  
65 The Commonwealth Senate Community Affairs References Committee recently completed its 
Australia-wide Inquiry Into Children In Institutional Care. Its first report, Forgotten Australians: A 
report on Australians who experienced institutional or out-of-home care as children, is available at 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/clac_ctte/inst_care/report/index.htm?>. A second report 
will be published later in 2004 about abuse of children in foster care. 
66 In South Australia on 1 July 2004 the Commission of Inquiry (Children in State Care) Bill was 
introduced. The Commission of Inquiry (Children in State Care) Act 2004 (SA) has since been 
enacted but has not yet commenced.  
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civil courts and compensation. There are no sound jurisdiction-specific reasons for 
having such differences, nor are there good theoretical reasons for having these 
differences. There is strong theoretical evidence underpinning the special limitation 
period, and this evidence has been acknowledged even by bodies charged with the 
contraction of the civil litigation system. In this context, for the fundamental purpose 
of seeking access to the court system, like cases should be treated similarly. This is a 
matter of equality in a liberal society which aspires to embody the rule of law. A child 
abuse victim in one State should not receive a significantly smaller temporal 
opportunity to access the civil courts than that granted to his or her counterparts in 
another Australian jurisdiction, provided that the longer period is justified. For the 
purpose of deciding how long a person should have to bring a civil claim for a defined 
class of action, citizens in the same country should be treated equally. 
Second, since some families will live in a number of jurisdictions over time, and 
since child abuse often occurs over extended periods of time, especially when 
inflicted by a family member, jurisdictional disparities in limitation periods on the 
scale of these now existing will encourage forum shopping. A survivor of child abuse 
where the acts of abuse occurred in a number of jurisdictions could not be blamed for 
seeking civil compensation in the jurisdiction having a legal framework that was most 
likely to advance his or her case. This selection between jurisdictions will be likely to 
create technical legal problems and will add to the length, cost and complexity of 
trials.  
Finally, related with the first two problems, the presence of inequalities that create 
disparate outcomes in matters of social justice constitutes especially strong evidence 
of an unjust legal system that adds to its disrepute with the public. Especially in 
contexts where legal provisions are created to offer relief to those who have been 
particularly mistreated, there is a need for largely consistent legal provisions to avoid 
this disrepute and loss of public confidence in the legal system. 
5. Conclusion 
The Ipp Report acknowledged the ‘bewildering array of different limitation regimes 
in Australian jurisdictions.’67 The amendments made in New South Wales and 
Victoria create more justifiable conditions for survivors of child abuse committed by 
certain classes of wrongdoers in those two jurisdictions. However, the bewildering 
array of legislative provisions in these types of cases has not been in any way 
diminished. The actions of these two legislatures in recognising the unjustifiability of 
short limitation periods in at least these types of child abuse cases creates more 
fragments in an already fractured legislative environment. Yet, the reform of those 
provisions serves to illuminate even more sharply the shortcomings of comparable 
provisions in other Australian jurisdictions. 
 
                                                 
67 Ipp Report, above n 1, at 87 [6.8]. 
